

Message Text

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 CCO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00

INRE-00 /026 W

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O P 061640 Z APR 73

FM USDEL SALT TWO II

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1926

INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY

USMISSION NATO PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 USDEL SALT TWO II 0145

EXDIS/ SALT

DOD HANDLE AS SPECAT FOR SECDEF

E. O. 11652 XGDSI

TAGS: PARM

SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR JOHNSON' S STATEMENT OF APRIL 6, 1973

THE FOLLOWING IS STATEMENT DELIVERED BY AMBASSADOR JOHNSON
AT THE APRIL 6, 1973 SALT MEETING.

STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR JOHNSON

APRIL 6, 1973

MR. MINISTER:

THE UNITED STATES DELEGATION HAS GIVEN CAREFUL STUDY TO
YOUR STATEMENT OF APRIL 3. THIS MORNING I WISH TO PRESENT
SOME REACTIONS OF THE US DELEGATION TO THIS STATEMENT AND
TO ADDRESS CERTAIN ISSUES WHICH OUR EXCHANGES OF VIEWS
OVER THESE PAST FOUR WEEKS HAVE STILL NOT RESOLVED.

I

AS I SEE IT, OUR FUNDAMENTAL TASK -- THE CHARGE GIVEN
TO THE DELEGATIONS BY OUR RESPECTIVE GOVERNMENTS -- IS TO
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WORK OUT A PERMANENT AGREEMENT LIMITING STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS TO REPLACE THE INTERIM AGREEMENT. THIS PERMANENT AGREEMENT IS INTENDED TO OPERATE IN PARALLEL WITH THE ABM TREATY. IF MY UNDERSTANDING OF THE SOVIET POSITION IS CORRECT, THERE IS NO DISAGREEMENT BETWEEN THE SIDES ON THIS POINT. IT IS CLEAR THAT BOTH SIDES APPEAR TO ENVISAGE A PERMANENT AGREEMENT WHICH WILL REPLACE THE INTERIM AGREEMENT AND WHICH WILL BE " MORE COMPLETE" THAN THE INTERIM AGREEMENT, BOTH IN TERMS OF ITS SCOPE AND IN TERMS OF ITS DURATION.

HOWEVER, I HAVE NOTED THAT SOVIET STATEMENTS HAVE REFERRED TO " AN UNDERSTANDING ON MORE COMPLETE THE CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES ON MARCH 15-- IN ORDER TO MAKE A CONTRIBUTION TOWARD THE APPLICATION IN GOOD FAITH OF THE TRUCE IN VIETNAM AND THE CIVIL DEVELOPMENT OF FREE AND DEMOCRATIC ELECTIONS. END QUOTE

3. I IMMEDIATELY SENT A LETTER OF PROTEST TO FOREIGN MINISTER MEDICI EXPRESSING MY SURPRISE AND DEEP DISAPPOINTMENT. I HAVE ALSO REQUESTED AN EXPLANATION IN VIEW OF THE ASSURANCES GIVEN ME BY THE FOREIGN MINISTER HIMSELF AND REITERATED BY MINISTER CAGIATI IN THE OFFICE OF THE PRIME MINISTER. VOLPE

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INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 CCO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00

INRE-00 /026 W

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O P 061640 Z APR 73
FM USDEL SALT TWO II
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S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 USDEL SALT TWO II 0145

EXDIS/ SALT

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THE SIDES HAVE, ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS, ADDRESSED THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK UPON WHICH WE HOPE TO ATTACH THE FABRIC OF A LASTING AND MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL AGREEMENT. THIS DIA-LOGUE ABOUT FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTS SEEMS TO ME TO HAVE LEFT US STILL FAR FROM A COMMON UNDERSTANDING. IT WOULD BE A BETTER SITUATION IF BOTH SIDES HAD A CLEARER UNDERSTANDING OF ONE ANOTHER'S VIEWS ON STRATEGIC CONCEPTS. THIS WOULD AFFECT IN A POSITIVE WAY THE PERCEPTIONS OUR TWO COUNTRIES HAVE OF ONE ANOTHER AND WOULD CERTAINLY FACILITATE OUR SPECIFIC TASK HERE IN GENEVA.

THE SIDES HAVE DISCUSSED A NUMBER OF CONCEPTS WHICH ATTEMPT TO DESCRIBE THE ATTRIBUTES OF A MUTUALLY SATIS-FACTORY AGREEMENT. THESE HAVE INCLUDED MUTUAL SECURITY, STRATEGIC STABILITY, DETERRENCE, EQUALITY, EQUAL SECURITY, ESSENTIAL EQUIVALENCE AND NO UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE. I BELIEVE THAT A SIGNIFICANT LEVEL OF AGREEMENT EXISTS BETWEEN THE SIDES THAT AN AGREEMENT SHOULD EMBODY THESE CONCEPTS.

THE US SIDE RECOGNIZES THAT THERE ARE A VARIETY OF FACTORS-- GEOGRAPHICAL, HISTORICAL, POLITICAL AND OTHERS -- WHICH INFLUENCE THE APPROACHES OF THE TWO SIDES TO THE TASKS BEFORE US. THESE FACTORS ARE EXTREMELY COMPLEX AND
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THEIR INTERPRETATION IS NECESSARILY SUBJECTIVE. THE US SIDE HAS EMPHASIZED CRITERIA OF A MORE OBJECTIVE CHARACTER, MEASURES TO
LIMIT STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS." IT IS NOT CLEAR WHETHER OR NOT THE SOVIET DELEGATION INTENDS TO DRAW A DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE TERMS " UNDERSTANDING" AND " AGREEMENT". THE US SIDE BELIEVES THAT THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN AN " UNDERSTANDING" AND AN " AGREEMENT" IS VERY CONSIDERABLE. I AM SURE YOU WILL RECALL THE DISCUSSIONS OF THE DIFFERENCES IN THESE TERMS WHICH TOOK PLACE IN THE FIRST PHASE OF SALT. WE HOPE, THEREFORE, THAT THE SOVIET SIDE WILL CLARIFY THE MEANING IT ATTACHES TO THE WORD " UNDERSTANDING", AS USED IN ITS RECENT STATEMENT.

II

IN STUDYING YOUR STATEMENT OF APRIL 3, MR. MINISTER, WE NOTED THAT YOU PLACED FIRST ON YOUR LIST OF PROBLEMS TO BE SOLVED " THE ESTABLISHMENT OF LEVELS FOR STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS."

I AM PLEASED TO SEE THIS MENTION OF LEVELS BECAUSE, AS YOU KNOW, THE US SIDE HAS ADVANCED AT OUR MEETINGS THE CON-

CEPT OF AN OVER- ALL NUMERICAL EQUALITY IN THE CEILING ON ICBMS, SLBMS, AND HEAVY BOMBERS PERMITTED TO EACH SIDE. I WOULD APPRECIATE IT IF THE SOVIET SIDE WOULD CLARIFY WHETHER IT, TOO, ENVISAGES AN EQUAL OVER- ALL AGGREGATE LEVEL ENCOMPASSING THESE THREE SYSTEMS OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE WEAPONS.

AS A SECOND PART OF ITS PROPOSAL, THE US SIDE HAS PUT FORWARD THE CONCEPT THAT WITHIN THIS OVER- ALL AGGREGATE, THERE SHOULD BE AN EQUAL CEILING ON THE NUMBERS OF ICBM LAUNCHERS.

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IT WOULD BE HELPFUL IN MOVING OUR NEGOTIATIONS FORWARD IF THE SOVIET SIDE WOULD INDICATE ITS ATTITUDE TOWARD THIS SPECIFIC ASPECT, AND I WOULD WELCOME THE COMMENTS OF THE SOVIET SIDE.

AS A THIRD PART OF ITS PROPOSAL, THE US SIDE HAS CALLED FOR AN EQUAL CEILING IN OVER- ALL ICBM THROW- WEIGHT. ALTHOUGH THE SOVIET SIDE HAS EXPRESSED ITSELF NEGATIVELY ON THIS SPECIFIC ASPECT OF OUR PROPOSAL, I HOPE THAT TO FACILITATE PROGRESS IN OUR NEGOTIATIONS THE SOVIET SIDE WILL RECONSIDER ITS POSITION ON THIS HIGHLY IMPORTANT ELEMENT OF OUR TASK OF LIMITING STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE WEAPONS. WE ARE CONVINCED THAT THE PRESENT US POSITION REGARDING AN EQUAL CEILING ON OVER- ALL ICBM THROW- WEIGHT IS NECESSARY TO FULFILL THE PRINCIPLES OF EQUAL SECURITY AND NO UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE. I HOPE THAT THE SOVIET SIDE WILL SHARE WITH US THE REASONS WHY IT BELIEVES ONE SIDE SHOULD BE ENTITLED TO THE INDEFINITE PRESERVATION OF A SEVERAL- FOLD ADVANTAGE IN ICBM THROW- WEIGHT OVER THE OTHER SIDE. I AM SURE, MR. MINISTER, YOU WILL AGREE THAT IN VIEW OF THE EXTREMELY COMPLEX TASK THAT CONFRONTS BOTH SIDES AT THIS NEGOTIATING TABLE, EACH SIDE SHOULD BE AS FRANK AS POSSIBLE IN EXPLAINING ITS POSITIONS.

IN CONNECTION WITH THE PROPOSALS PUT FORWARD BY THE US SIDE CONCERNING AN AGGREGATE LEVEL FOR ICBMS, SLBMS, AND HEAVY BOMBERS, AS WELL AS SUB- CEILINGS FOR ICBM LAUNCHERS AND A LIMIT ON THROW- WEIGHT OF THE ICBM FORCES ON EACH SIDE, WE HAVE ALSO ADVANCED THE CONCEPT OF AN APPROPRIATE FREEDOM TO MIX WITHIN THESE THREE SYSTEMS OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE WEAPONS. THUS FAR, WE HAVE NOT HEARD HOW THE SOVIET DELEGATION REGARDS THIS CONCEPT. IT WOULD BE BENEFICIAL TO OUR JOINT WORK, MR. MINISTER, FOR US TO LEARN THE VIEWS OF THE SOVIET SIDE WITH REGARD TO THIS SPECIFIC PROPOSAL.

SECRET

*** Current Handling Restrictions *** EXDIS

*** Current Classification *** SECRET

Message Attributes

Automatic DecapTIONing: Z
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: n/a
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 06 APR 1973
DecapTION Date: 28 MAY 2004
DecapTION Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: boyleja
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1973SALTT00145
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: RR
Errors: n/a
Film Number: n/a
From: SALT TALKS
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1973/newtext/t19730434/aaaahsdw.tel
Line Count: 222
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE
Office: ACTION SS
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 5
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Reference: n/a
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: boyleja
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags: ANOMALY
Review Date: 03 AUG 2001
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <03-Aug-2001 by boyleja>; APPROVED <17-Sep-2001 by boyleja>
Review Markings:

Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
30 JUN 2005

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: <DBA CORRECTED> gwr 971202
Subject: AMBASSADOR JOHNSON' S STATEMENT OF APRIL 6, 1973
TAGS: PARM
To: MOSCOW
NATO
SECSTATE WASHDC
SS
Type: TE
Markings: Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005